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Abstract
Sequential allocation is a simple and attractive mechanism for
the allocation of indivisible goods. Agents take turns, accord-
ing to a policy, to pick items. Sequential allocation is guaran-
teed to return an allocation which is efficient but may not have
an optimal social welfare. We consider therefore the relation
between welfare and efficiency. We study the (computational)
questions of what welfare is possible or necessary depend-
ing on the choice of policy. We also consider a novel control
problem in which the chair chooses a policy to improve social
welfare.
Introduction
Due to economical, environmental and political concerns,
we often want to do more with fewer resources and to do
so more fairly. One way to achieve this is to use comput-
ing power to improve the efficiency and equitability of the
allocation. One important and challenging case is the fair di-
vision of indivisible goods. This captures a wide range of
problems including allocating classes to students, landing
slots to airlines, players to teams, and houses to people.
A simple but popular mechanism to allocate indivisible
goods is sequential allocation (Brams and Taylor 1996).
Agents simply take turns to pick items. The sequential al-
location mechanism leaves open the particular order used to
take turns (the so called “policy”). Is it fairest perhaps to
have a balanced alternating policy in which items are allo-
cated in rounds, each agent picks one item in each round, but
we reverse the order of the agents after each round. Indeed,
there are real world settings like course allocation at the Har-
vard Business School where the policy is chosen at random
from a space of balanced alternating policies as a means of
ensuring (procedural) fairness.
The choice of policy impacts the welfare of the result-
ing allocation. This raises the question of what social wel-
fare can or must be achieved. Do we necessarily achieve a
minimum acceptable welfare whatever policy is chosen? Is
is possible that the welfare is above a required minimum?
What is the maximum welfare that can be achieved? What is
the minimum welfare that will be achieved? These questions
are closely related to an interesting control problem. Can a
(benevolent) chair choose a policy to improve or maximize
welfare? These questions are also related to the expected
welfare when the policy is chosen at random. For example,
the expected welfare is between the minimum welfare that is
necessary and the maximum welfare that is possible (strictly
so when they are different).
We are not the first to consider what allocations are pos-
sible or necessary depending on the choice of policy. Aziz,
Walsh and Xia (2015) ask what item or (sub)set of items
can or will be allocated depending on the choice of policy.
By comparison, we consider here not the items allocated but
the welfare achieved. We are also not the first to consider
the policy that maximizes welfare. For example, Bouveret
and Lang (2011) ask what is the “optimal” policy that max-
imizes the expected egalitarian or utilitarian social welfare.
However, their model supposes that the ordinal preferences
are not known by the chair and optimality is in expecta-
tion under two extreme assumptions: full independence (all
rankings equiprobable) and full correlation (identical rank-
ings). By comparison, we consider here the case where the
we know the exact utilities and can therefore maximize the
actual social welfare.
Sequential allocation is an ordinal mechanism (it merely
requires agents to declare an ordering over items). In many
of our settings, however, we suppose that we know the
agents’ utilities. This may be because we know the ordinal
preferences but utilities can be easily computed from these
(e.g. Borda or lexicographical utilities). In other cases, we
might suppose that we have elicited the agents’ general util-
ities, and we then compute a policy to maximize welfare
which we announce and use to allocate items using sequen-
tial allocation. Even in this more complex setting, we retain
some of the advantages of a purely ordinal mechanism. For
instance, it is easy for the agents to verify that the policy
is fair (e.g. it is a balanced alternating policy), and the part
of the mechanism allocating items according to the declared
policy has been applied correctly.
Welfare and efficiency
We first consider the precise relationship between social
welfare and efficiency. We suppose that there are n agents
being allocated m items. Agents have additive utilities over
the items. Agents convert these into a strict ordinal ranking
over items, breaking any ties in utility in some fixed way.
The welfare of an agent is simply the sum of the utilities of
the items allocated to that agent. The utilitarian welfare is the
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sum of the welfare of the agents, whilst the egalitarian wel-
fare is that of the worst off agent (or agents). The sequential
allocation mechanism is parameterized by the policy, the or-
der in which agents pick items. For example, with the policy
123321, agent 1 picks first, then agent 2, then agent 3 be-
fore we repeat in reverse. An allocation is an assignment of
items to agents. One allocation Pareto improves another iff
each agent has at least the same utility in the first, and there
is at least one agent where the utility is greater. An alloca-
tion is Pareto efficient iff there is no allocation which Pareto
improves it. For every Pareto efficient allocation, there ex-
ists a policy such that sincere picking with this policy gen-
erates this allocation. We can construct this policy using the
greedy algorithm in the proof of Proposition 1 in (Brams
and King 2005). The reverse, however, is not true. Sincere
picking may not return a Pareto efficient allocation.
Remark 1. Sincere picking can generate allocations that
are not Pareto efficient.
Proof: Consider the policy 1221. Suppose the agents’ utili-
tiea are as follows
a b c d
1 5 4 2 0
2 8 2 1 0
Both agents have the same total utility over the items. Sin-
cere picking gives items a and d to agent 1 and items b and
c to agent 2. This gives an utility of 5 to agent 1 and of 3 to
agent 2. If they swap allocations, then the utility of agent 1
increases to 6, and of agent 2 to 8. Hence, sincere picking
leads to an allocation that is not Pareto efficient, and does
not have the optimal egalitarian or utilitarian social welfare.

We contrast this observation with Proposition 1 in (Brams
and King 2005). This looks just at the rank of items in an
agent’s preference ordering, ignoring their precise utilities.
Given two sets of items S and S′ with |S| = |S′|, an alloca-
tion of items S to an agent dominates the allocation of items
S′ iff for every item in S − S′ there is a different item in
S′ − S that is strictly less preferred. They then define an or-
dering, ordinal efficiency in terms of such domination. This
is a strictly weaker ordering than Pareto efficiency which is
defined in terms of utilities rather than ordinal rankings.
Proposition 1 in (Brams and King 2005) demonstrates that
ordinal efficiency corresponds exactly to allocations gener-
ated by sequential allocation supposing sincere picking. On
the other hand, only a subset of the allocations returned by
sequential allocation are Pareto efficient. And only a subset
of these maximize the egalitarian social welfare. We high-
light the fact that there exists an allocation with the maxi-
mum possible egalitarian welfare.
Remark 2. There exists an allocation with the maximum
possible egalitarian social welfare that is also Pareto effi-
cient.
The argument is as follows. Among all allocations with
maximum egalitarian welfare choose one with the largest
utilitarian welfare. This allocation is clearly Pareto efficient.
It follows quickly that there always exists a policy for se-
quential allocation that gives an allocation with the maxi-
mum possible egalitarian social welfare supposing sincere
Figure 1: Relationship between different allocations. Se-
quential allocation with sincere picking can generate any or-
dinal efficient allocation.
picking. Note that the proof does not rule out other alloca-
tions which maximize egalitarian social welfare which are
not ordinal efficient, and which cannot be generated by se-
quential allocation with sincere picking.
Example 1. Suppose we have three agents (1 to 3), three
items (a to c), and Borda utilities. Let agent 1 have a pref-
erence order bac, agent 2 have abc, and agent 3 have acb.
Then the allocation which gives a to agent 1, b to agent 2 and
c to agent 3 maximizes the egalitarian social welfare. How-
ever, there is no policy for sequential allocation that will
return such an allocation supposing agents pick sincerely as
no agent gets a first choice item.
Maximizing the utilitarian social welfare also does not
conflict with Pareto efficiency. In this case, we point out the
well-known fact that any allocation that maximizes utilitar-
ian social welfare is Pareto efficient.
Remark 3. Any allocation with the maximum possible util-
itarian social welfare is also Pareto efficient.
The argument is as follows. Consider any allocation that
has the maximum possible utilitarian social welfare. Sup-
pose there exists another allocation which Pareto improves
it. Then the utility of every agent does not decrease. This
means that the sum of their utilities must increase. This con-
tradicts the assumption that we have the maximum possible
utilitarian social welfare.
Again it follows quickly that there exists a policy that
gives an allocation with the maximum possible utilitarian
social welfare supposing sincere picking.
Possible and necessary welfare
Since sequential allocation may not return allocations that
are optimal from either an egalitarian or utilitarian perspec-
tive, we turn to the (computational) questions of what so-
cial welfare is possible or necessary. Note that throughout
this paper, we suppose agents pick sincerely. Whilst strate-
gic behaviour may be beneficial, risk averse agents will tend
to pick sincerely, especially when the policy and/or utilities
are private information. Nevertheless, it would be interest-
ing future work to consider agents acting strategically (Kali-
nowski et al. 2013).
POSSIBLE/NECESSARY UTILITARIAN/ EGALITAR-
IAN WELFARE
Input: a set of n items, m agents each with utilities
over the items, a class of policies, and an integer t.
Question: Is there a policy/Does every policy result
in an allocation with an utilitarian/egalitarian social
welfare of t or greater supposing agents pick items
sincerely?
The possible welfare questions answer a policy control
problem: can the chair choose a policy to achieve a given
social welfare? Similar control problems have been consid-
ered previously (Aziz, Walsh, and Xia 2015) but with the
goal of allocating particular items to agents, rather than, as
here, of achieving a particular welfare. Note that we sup-
pose we know the (private) utilities of the agents. Our com-
plexity results can be seen as lower bounding the compu-
tational complexity when we only have partial information
about the actual utilities. Alternatively, we may relax the
assumption that we know the actual utilities. For exam-
ple, as in (Brams, Edelman, and Fishburn 2003; Bouveret
and Lang 2011; Kalinowski, Narodytska, and Walsh 2013;
Baumeister et al. 2014), we might suppose that the utilities
are simple functions of the ordinal rank (e.g. Borda, lexi-
cographical or quasi-indifferent scores). As this is a special
case of general utilities, any result that control takes poly-
nomial time in the general case will map onto a polynomial
time result in this more restricted setting.
When we prove that a particular possible or necessary
welfare problem takes polynomial time to solve, we will
typically do so by answering a closely related maximization
or minimization problem. Such problems are interesting in
their own right.
MAXIMUM/MINIMUM UTILITARIAN/ EGALITAR-
IAN WELFARE
Input: a set of n items, m agents each with utilities
over the items, and a class of policies.
Output: The maximum/minimum utilitar-
ian/egalitarian social welfare possible over all
policies supposing agents pick items sincerely.
All possible policies
If any policy is possible, it is easy to maximize the utilitarian
social welfare. The chair just need to choose a policy that
gives items to the agents which value them most.
Theorem 1. The MAXIMUM and POSSIBLE UTILITARIAN
WELFARE problems are polynomial time solvable.
Proof: We order the items by the maximum utility assigned
by any agent. Ties can be broken in any way. We then con-
struct the policy that allocates items in this order choosing
the agent who gives an item the greater utility. No allocation
can do better than this. 
The MINIMUM EGALITARIAN WELFARE problem also
takes polynomial time to solve. It is always zero. On the
other hand, the POSSIBLE EGALITARIAN WELFARE prob-
lem is intractable in general, even in the special case that all
the agents have identical utilities for the items.
Theorem 2. The POSSIBLE EGALITARIAN WELFARE
problem for m items and n agents is strongly NP-complete
when m > 2n.
Proof: Membership in NP is shown by giving the policy.
The proof uses a reduction from numerical 3-dimensional
matching. Given an integer t and 3 multisets X =
{x1, . . . , xn}, Y = {y1, . . . , yn} and Z = {z1, . . . , zn} of
integers with
∑n
i=1(xi+ yi+ zi) = nt, this problem asks if
there are permutations σ and pi such that xi+yσ(i)+zpi(i) =
t for all i ∈ [n]. We construct an allocation problem over n
agents and m > 2n items as follows. Let u = 1 +
∑n
i=1 zi.
For every j ∈ [n], there is a “big” item with utility u+xi+yj
for agent i (i = 1, . . . , n) and a “small” item which all
agents give utility zj . Finally, there are m − 2n items with
zero utility for all agents. We ask if we can achieve an
egalitarian welfare of u + t. To achieve this, each agent
must get precisely a utility of u + t. This is only possi-
ble if each agent gets one big item and one small item, and
xi + yσ(i) + zpi(i) = t where σ(i) and pi(i) denote are the
indices of the big and the small item obtained by agent i.
Therefore, we can achieve the egalitarian welfare of u+ t iff
there is a solution of the original numerical 3-dimensional
matching problem. 
The same reduction proves that the MAXIMUM EGAL-
ITARIAN WELFARE problem is NP-hard to compute. In
the more restricted setting that utilities are Borda scores
but agents have different ordinal preferences, the POSSIBLE
and MAXIMUM EGALITARIAN WELFARE problems remain
NP-hard. This follows from the reduction used to prove The-
orem 3 in (Baumeister et al. 2013) (due to an anonymous
reviewer of the paper). It proves that deciding if there is an
allocation with an egalitarian social welfare greater than or
equal to some constant t is NP-complete even when utilities
are Borda scores. It is easy to show that there is a policy that
finds the precise allocation constructed in this reduction.
Balanced policies
It might be considered unfair to use any policy, even one
in which one agent gets many more items than another.
Whilst looking for allocations that maximize fairness and
efficiency, Brams and King (2005) observe that “the sym-
bolic value of giving players equal numbers of items, such
as landing slots at an airport, may be important”. We there-
fore consider the restricted class of balanced policies. In a
balanced policy, each agent gets the same number of items.
For simplicity, we suppose the number of items is an integer
multiple of the number of agents and add dummy items of no
utility otherwise. Limiting sequential allocation to balanced
policies impacts the social welfare that can be obtained.
To maximize utilitarian welfare, we cannot simply give
items to the agents that value them most. This may violate
balance. Despite this restriction, we can still find the policy
that maximizes the utilitarian welfare in polynomial time.
Theorem 3. The MAXIMUM and POSSIBLE UTILITARIAN
WELFARE problems for balanced policies take polynomial
time to solve.
Proof: We suppose that there are kn items to divide be-
tween the n agents. We set up a min cost max flow prob-
lem. We connect the source node to nodes representing the
agents, each with a capacity of k and no cost. We connect the
nodes representing agents to nodes representing the items.
Each edge has a capacity of 1, and a cost equal to minus
the utility that the agent assigns to the item. Finally we con-
nect the nodes representing the items to the target node, each
with an edge of capacity 1 and zero cost. We find a Pareto
efficient allocation from any such flow using the top trading
cycle algorithm (Shapley and Scarf 1974). A policy can be
constructed that achieves this Pareto efficient allocation by
again exploiting Proposition 1 in (Brams and King 2005). 
By comparison, the NECESSARY UTILITARIAN WEL-
FARE problem is intractable for balanced policies.
Theorem 4. The NECESSARY UTILITARIAN WELFARE
problem for balanced policies is coNP-complete.
Proof: We reduce from the NECESSARY ITEM problem for
balanced policies which is coNP-complete even when lim-
ited to an agent’s most preferred item (Aziz, Walsh, and Xia
2015). Let one agent have utility of 1 for their most pre-
ferred item, and zero utility for all others. By comparison,
let the other agents all have utility 1 for every item. Then
the NECESSARY ITEM problem is equivalent to asking if an
utilitarian welfare of m or more is necessary. 
It follows that the MINIMUM UTILITARIAN WELFARE
problem for balanced policies is NP-hard to compute. Re-
stricting to balanced policies also does not change the NP-
hardness of the MAXIMUM and POSSIBLE EGALITARIAN
WELFARE problems. This follows almost immediately from
the reduction used in the proof of Theorem 2. Note that
this reduction uses policies in which some agents get less
than 3 items (which are not balanced). However, such unbal-
anced policies can be trivially ignored as they result in poor
egalitarian social welfare. Note also that when a numerical
3-dimensional matching exists, the corresponding success-
ful policy constructed in the reduction is balanced. When
utilities are specified in binary, an easy reduction from the
EQUI-PARTITION problem demonstrates that the POSSIBLE
EGALITARIAN WELFARE problem restricted to balanced
policies is NP-complete even with just two agents who have
identical utilities. Finally, the NECESSARY EGALITARIAN
WELFARE problem is intractable for balanced policies.
Theorem 5. The NECESSARY EGALITARIAN WELFARE
problem for balanced policies is coNP-complete.
Proof: The same reduction as in the proof of Theorem 4. 
Recursively balanced policies
Balanced policies might still be considered unfair. For ex-
ample, a policy like 11112222 favours the first agent even
though it is balanced, and is guaranteed to return a Pareto
efficient allocation. We therefore consider an even more re-
strictive class: recursively balanced policies. In such a pol-
icy, items are allocated in rounds, and each agent appears
once in each round. For simplicity, we again suppose that
the number of items is an integer multiple of the number of
agents and add dummy items of no utility otherwise. When
the number of items equals the number of agents, all bal-
anced policies are recursively balanced. For this reason, we
focus on problems where the number of items exceeds the
number of agents. Recursively balanced policies include the
balanced alternating policy (12211221. . . ), as well as the
Thue-Morse sequence (122121121221. . . ). With two agents,
recursively balanced policies are concatenations of 12 and
21. Other simple properties of recursively balanced poli-
cies follow immediately from their definition. For exam-
ple, no agent has more than two successive picks in a re-
cursively balanced policy. Limiting sequential allocation to
recursively balanced policies may further impact the social
welfare that can be obtained.
There are several situations where focusing on recursively
balanced policies does not hurt welfare. For example, with
Borda utilities, the expected utilitarian social welfare for two
agents is not impacted by limiting allocation to recursively
balanced policies. The simple alternating policy which is
recursively balanced is optimal in expectation (Kalinowski,
Narodytska, and Walsh 2013). Similarly for Borda utilities
and small n, the expected egalitarian social welfare for two
agents is not impacted. We have computed the policies that
maximize expected egalitarian social welfare for up to 12
items and for each n, at least one optimal policy is recur-
sively balanced.
In general, restricting to recursively balanced policies re-
sults in it being intractable to decide if a given egalitarian or
utilitarian welfare can or must be achieved.
Theorem 6. The POSSIBLE EGALITARIAN and POSSIBLE
UTILITARIAN WELFARE problems for recursively balanced
policies are NP-complete, whilst the NECESSARY EGAL-
ITARIAN and NECESSARY UTILITARIAN WELFARE are
coNP-complete.
Proof: We reduce from the corresponding problem of de-
ciding whether the top k most preferred items of an agent
are possible or necessary (Aziz, Walsh, and Xia 2015). The
TOP-k POSSIBLE SET problem for recursively balanced
policies is NP-complete for k ≥ 3. We reduce this to the
POSSIBLE EGALITARIAN WELFARE problem as follows.
Let one agent have utility of k2 for their ith most preferred
items (i ≤ k) and zero utility for all others. By compari-
son, let the other agents all have utility k3 or greater for any
item. Then the TOP-k POSSIBLE SET problem is equivalent
to asking if an egalitarian welfare of k3 or more is possi-
ble. We also reduce the TOP-k POSSIBLE SET problem to
the POSSIBLE UTILITARIAN WELFARE problem as follows.
Let one agent have utility ofmk2 for their ith most preferred
items (i ≤ k) and zero utility for all others. By compari-
son, let all the other agents have utility of k or less for any
item. Then the TOP-k POSSIBLE SET problem is equivalent
to asking if an utilitarian welfare ofmk3 or more is possible.
The TOP-k NECESSARY SET problem is coNP-complete
for recursively balanced policies. We reduce this to the NEC-
ESSARY EGALITARIAN WELFARE problem as follows. Let
one agent have total utility of k2 for their k most preferred
items and zero utility for all others. By comparison, let the
other agents all have utility k3 or greater for any item. Then
the TOP-k NECESSARY SET problem is equivalent to asking
if an egalitarian welfare of k2 is necessary. We also reduce
the TOP-k NECESSARY SET problem to the NECESSARY
UTILITARIAN WELFARE problem as follows. Let one agent
have utility ofmk2 for their ith most preferred items (i ≤ k)
and zero utility for all others. By comparison, let all the other
agents have utility of k or less for any item. Then the TOP-k
NECESSARY SET problem is equivalent to asking if an util-
itarian welfare of mk3 or more is necessary. 
Even when agents have identical utilities, these problems
can remain intractable.
Theorem 7. When allocating 2n items between two agents,
the POSSIBLE EGALITARIAN WELFARE problem for recur-
sively balanced policies is NP-complete even when agents
have identical utilities given in binary.
Proof: Membership in NP is clear. For the hardness we use
reduction from PARTITION: for positive integers a1, . . . , an
with a1+ · · ·+an = 2B, the problem is to decide if there is
a nonempty set I ⊆ [n] with∑i∈I ai = B. We reduce this
to the POSSIBLE EGALITARIAN WELFARE problem for two
agents and 2n items with utilities c1 = 2B, c2n = 0, and
c2k = c2k+1 = c2k−1 − ak for k = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1.
Let C =
∑2n
i=1 ci be the sum of the utilities. Note that
an egalitarian welfare of C/2 is equivalent to both agents
achieving the same utility u1 = u2. In round k, the items
with utilities c2k−1 and c2k are allocated. From c2k−1 −
c2k = ak it follows that the difference u1 − u2 between
the agents’ utilities increases by ak if agent 1 starts and de-
creases if agent 2 starts. Let I ⊆ [n] be the set of rounds in
which agent 1 starts. An egalitarian social welfare of C/2 is
achieved if and only if
0 = u1 − u2 =
∑
k∈I
ak −
∑
k∈[n]\I
ak,
i.e., if and only if there is a perfect partition. 
Balanced alternating policies
The final and most restricted class of policies we consider
is that of balanced alternating. This is the subclass of recur-
sively balanced policies in which each round is the reverse
of the previous. When allocating students to courses at the
Harvard Business School, such a policy is chosen uniformly
at random from the space of all possible balanced alternating
policies. This gives a form of procedural fairness.
Theorem 8. The POSSIBLE EGALITARIAN and POSSIBLE
UTILITARIAN WELFARE problems for balanced alternating
policies are NP-complete, whilst the NECESSARY EGAL-
ITARIAN and NECESSARY UTILITARIAN WELFARE are
coNP-complete.
Proof: By reduction as in the proof of Theorem 6 from the
corresponding TOP-k POSSIBLE or NECESSARY SET prob-
lem restricted to balanced alternating policies. The TOP-k
POSSIBLE problem for balanced alternating policies is NP-
complete for k ≥ 2, whilst the TOP-k NECESSARY SET
problem is coNP-complete (Aziz, Walsh, and Xia 2015). 
It follows that it is NP-hard to compute the probability that
the Harvard Business School course allocation mechanism
returns an allocation with egalitarian or utilitarian welfare
greater than or equal to some given value, t.
Two agents
We now consider some special cases which are more
tractable. With two agents, we can find a balanced policy
that maximizes the egalitarian or utilitarian welfare in poly-
nomial time.
Theorem 9. The MAXIMUM EGALITARIAN and MAX-
IMUM UTILITARIAN WELFARE problems with balanced
policies can be be solved in O(k2n3) and O(kn2) time re-
spectively when allocating 2n items between two agents with
utilities (that may be different) taken from [0, k].
Proof: We put the items into some (arbitrary) order and
consider how each item is allocated in turn. We construct a
2n step dynamic program in which the ith step corresponds
to the decision of where to allocate the ith item in this order.
The states of this dynamic program are triples containing the
number of items allocated to the first agent, the sum of the
utilities of the items so far allocated to the first agent, and
the sum of the utilities of the items so far allocated to the
second agent. We can compute the number of items allocated
to the second agent from this. As both sums are bounded in
size by 2kn, this dynamic program has O(k2n3) states. For
the maximum utilitarian welfare, the states of the dynamic
program can be simpler and just need to be pairs containing
the number of items allocated to the first agent, and the sum
of the utilities of the items so far allocated to both agents. 
This result generalizes to a bounded number of agents.
On the other hand, when utilities are specified in binary, an
easy reduction from the PARTITION problem demonstrates
that the POSSIBLE EGALITARIAN WELFARE problem is
NP-complete even when the two agents have identical util-
ities. This is almost identical to Proposition 2 in (Bouveret
and Lang 2011) which shows that deciding if there is a pol-
icy that ensures a given expected egalitarian welfare is NP-
complete when the utilities of the two agents are identical.
With recursively balanced policies, we consider the case
where agents have the same ordinal ranking over items.
Theorem 10. The MAXIMUM and POSSIBLE EGALITAR-
IAN WELFARE problems for recursively balanced policies
can be solved in O(k2n2), whilst the MAXIMUM and POS-
SIBLE UTILITARIAN WELFARE problems can be solved
in just O(kn) time when allocating 2n items between two
agents when agents have the same ordering over items but
possibly different utilities, and utilities are drawn from [0, k].
Proof: We construct a n step dynamic program in which
each step corresponds to one round of allocating one item
to each of the agents. The states of this dynamic program
are pairs containing the sums of the utilities of items so far
allocated to the two agents. As both sums are bounded by
kn, this dynamic program has O(k2n2) states. To compute
the optimal utilitarian social welfare, we can use a simpler
dynamic program where the states are just the sum of the
utilities allocated to the two agents. 
all policies balanced recursively balanced balanced alternating
POSSIBLE EGALITARIAN WELFARE NPC NPC NPC NPC
POSSIBLE UTILITARIAN WELFARE P P NPC NPC
NECESSARY EGALITARIAN WELFARE P coNPC coNPC coNPC
NECESSARY UTILITARIAN WELFARE ? coNPC coNPC coNPC
Table 1: Summary of results: NPC=NP-complete, P=polynomial.
This result again generalizes to a bounded number of
agents easily.
House allocation
Another more tractable case is house allocation, when we
have only as many items as agents. In this case, we can
solve the MAXIMUM and POSSIBLE EGALITARIAN WEL-
FARE problems over all possible policies in polynomial time.
We construct a graph between agents and items with edges
for all items that have a utility greater than or equal to the de-
sired egalitarian social welfare. The POSSIBLE EGALITAR-
IAN WELFARE problem is solvable if we can find a perfect
matching in this graph. To construct a satisfying policy, we
find a Pareto efficient allocation from this matching using
the top trading cycle algorithm (Shapley and Scarf 1974).
A policy can be constructed that achieves this Pareto ef-
ficient allocation using Proposition 1 in (Brams and King
2005). This tractability of this case suggests an interesting
open problem. We have proved that POSSIBLE EGALITAR-
IAN WELFARE problem is NP-complete for m = 2n but
takes polynomial time form = n. This leaves open the com-
plexity in between.
Other related work
As mentioned earlier, Bouveret and Lang (2011) consider
the case in which the utilities of items are simply functions
of the ordinal rankings. They prove that any recursively bal-
anced policy tends to an allocation giving the optimal ex-
pected egalitarian or utilitarian social welfare as the num-
ber of items grows, supposing sincere picking, utilities that
are Borda scores and all ordinal rankings being equiproba-
ble. In addition, they compute the optimal policies for max-
imizing the expected egalitarian or utilitarian social welfare
under the same assumptions for up to 12 items. The opti-
mal policies for two agents and an even number of items
are recursively balanced. Kalinowski, Narodytska and Walsh
(2013) prove that the alternating policy maximizes the ex-
pected utilitarian social welfare under these same assump-
tions. We again note that such results are about maximizing
the expected welfare supposing limited knowledge about the
utilities, whilst the results here about maximizing the exact
welfare supposing the chair knows the actual utilities.
There has been some study of strategic behaviour of
agents (as opposed to the chair) in the sequential alloca-
tion mechanism. It can, for example, be viewed as a re-
peated game. When all agents have complete information,
we can compute the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This
is unique and takes polynomial time to compute for two
agents (Kohler and Chandrasekaran 1971; Kalinowski et al.
2013), but for an arbitrary number of agents, there can be an
exponential number of equilibria and computing even one
is PSPACE-hard (Kalinowski et al. 2013). More recently,
Bouveret and Lang (2014) consider how an agent or coali-
tion of agents can strategically mis-report their preferences
in a sequential allocation mechanism supposing the other
agents act sincerely. They show that the loss of social wel-
fare caused by such manipulation is not great. For example,
with Borda scoring, two agents, and the alternating policy,
there was at most a 33% loss in the utilitarian welfare.
More recently, a family of rules for dividing indivisible
goods among agents has been proposed that take as input
the agents’ ordinal rankings over the items, a scoring vector,
and a social welfare aggregation function (Baumeister et al.
2013; Baumeister et al. 2014). They return the allocation that
maximizes the social welfare according to this scoring rule
and aggregation function. Whilst such rules have a number
of desirable properties like monotonicity, they have a num-
ber of less desirable properties including a high computa-
tional complexity to compute the actual allocation (unless
we have a bounded number of agents in which case we can
typically use dynamic programming). This contrasts with se-
quential allocation where computing the allocation take just
linear time. Baumeister et al. (2014) also compute the mul-
tiplicative/additive “price of elicitation-freeness”, the worst-
case ratio/difference in social welfare between such alloca-
tions and the allocation returned by sequential allocation.
Whilst their results are limited to simple alternating policies,
the prices are typically not great. For example, the optimal
utilitarian social welfare with Borda scores is at most twice
that returned by sequential allocation using simple alterna-
tion.
Conclusions
We have considered the implications on social welfare of
choosing different policies when using a sequential mech-
anism to allocate indivisible goods. In particular, we con-
sider the (computational) questions of what welfare is pos-
sible or necessary. The former is related to the control prob-
lem in which a (benevolent) chair chooses a policy for the
sequential allocation mechanism to improve the social wel-
fare. These questions are also related to the expected welfare
when we choose a policy uniformly at random. Our results
are summarized in Table 1. There are many interesting open
questions. For example, how difficult is it to find a recur-
sively balanced policy that returns a Pareto efficient alloca-
tion supposing agents pick sincerely?
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